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CHIEF JUSTICE NEMETZ'S JUDICIAL RECORD : 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
AND JUDICIAL VALUES 
DAVID S. COHENP* 
Much of Chief Justice Nemetz's life has been devoted to the public 
good and public service - to the betterment of society through law. 
Through his judgments and through his contribution to the adminiis- 
tration of justice in British Columbia and Canada,, he has brought 
the law closer to every one of us. Few of us can appreciate the degree 
of sacrifice and dedication to the public good which a life of judging 
requires. For all these reasons, and out of respect for the dedication 
of the judiciary, lawyers rarely discuss ccjudicial values" and par- 
ticularly the values of a specific judge; to do so risks exposing judges 
as human and law as human. 
Yet in talking about judicial values - even the values of a par- 
ticular judge - we are doing much more than talking about the per- 
sonal values of a specific person, inferred from his behaviour gener- 
ally. Rather we are describing and evaluating core institutional 
values - in particular the ways in which the legal system through 
its structure and process defines and proscribes the activity and 
choices of judges. Thus my subject is a judge as a member of a small 
t Associate Professor, of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. 
* Presented 22 March 1988. 
@ David S. Cohen, 1988. 
1 I am indebted to a student, Suzanne Frost, who asked me a simple question 
during a seminar discussion several years ago. "Why," she said, "does govern- 
ment compensation apply only to people who have homes and who have lost 
them in a natural disaster, and ignore those who have never had a home?" I 
am also indebted to Jonathan Kozol who, in a two part series on The Home- 
less published first in the New Yorker, 25 January 1988 and I February 1988, 
and then in a book, Rachel and Her Children: Homeless Families In America 
( I 988), exposed the tragedy of the homeless in urban America. 
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community of judges; and specifically my subject is judicial be- 
haviour on the bench as reflected in the outcome of cases and reasons 
for judgment. Whiie judges and lawyers necessarily spend a great 
deal of their time involved in individual cases: this series of lectures 
in honour of Chief Justice Nemetz permits us the privilege of stepping 
back from the day to day process of law, and allows us to think about 
the meaning and thus the place of law in Canadian society and the 
relationship of law to judicial values. 
I have always had difficulty attempting to comprehend the core 
value of law.3 Legal academics, judges and lawyers are familiar with 
ideas about "the rule of law",4 reasoned argument, principled deci- 
sion making, the rule of precedent and so on. Yet there always seemed 
to me to be something deeper about what law represented in our 
social order, something which is independent of the form of legal 
argument, the resolution of individual disputes, or debates between 
functionalists and rule-governed decision-makers. 
In particular, this attempt to articulate the core value of law is 
independent of the debate between the rationalists and intuitionists in 
explaining judicial behaviour. That is, the core value of law is inde- 
pendent of one's explanation of how judges make choices. I t  has little 
if anything to do with explanations of judicial judgment as the pro- 
cess of logic, information and mechanical jurisprudence, and oppos- 
ing theories which explain judicial choice as a product of "hunchyy 
and intuition and art. I would not even begin to explain or justify 
the arguments of Lord Denning that the foundation of law is reli- 
The core normative idea which I believe is and defines judicial 
2 I appreciate that many lawyers in private practice see law as individual cases 
and spend their time assisting individual clients. At best, law to practising 
lawyers may simply create parameters within which one engages in ad hoc 
dispute resolution (among monied classes). Law represents controlled chaos. 
3 What I mean by "core value" is an idea which describes what law is designed 
to do, what i t  always does and what i t  only does. It may extend to an idea 
which describes no other social institution, but that is likely an overstatement. 
4 There are many aspects of the rule of law which bear on the topic which I 
discuss in this paper. Perhaps the most problematical are decisions, including 
those of the Chief Justice, which rely on s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 
(U.K.),  30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, to require that certain bureaucrats, where they 
are invested with judicial authority, cannot be appointed except by the federal 
government as superior court judges. In  Concerned Citizens of B.C. v. Capital 
Regional District [1g81] I W.W.R. 359, Chief Justice Nemetz held that the 
Executive Council of British Columbia- the Cabinet - could not have the 
authority to review effluent permits, since in doing so it was exercising judicial 
authority, namely reviewing errors of law. 
5 "[Ilf we seek truth and justice, we cannot find it by argument and debate, 
nor by reading and thinking, but only by the maintenance of true religion and 
virtue." Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Denning, "The Influence of Religion on Law", 
33rd Earl Grey Memorial Lecture ( I 953) at  no. 
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behaviour goes even deeper, is more central than the debate between 
rationality and passion. I t  is independent of the intellectual processes, 
conscious or unconscious, which appear in judgments? It defines 
what law is and thus what judges do. 
What then is the core idea of law? The question, as I hope to 
demonstrate, can only be answered in a very abstract form: law 
preserves what we have. Its meaning, however, may be illustrated by 
a simple example. Several months ago, when I began thinking about 
this paper, I happened to be reading a series of articles on the home- 
less in urban A~nerica.~ I then realized (and this perhaps simply 
reflects my ignorance of the values inhering in law) that law offers 
valuable and unique assistance for some homeless families and tragi- 
cally ignores another group of families which, at least in terms of their 
homelessness, are indistinguishable from the firsk8 I would like to 
explore the meaning of this discrimination by imagining three home- 
less families.g 
The first homelcs family owned a home in the past, but has had its 
home either expr0priated.b~ the government or perhaps, as a result 
of government or police action, rendered worthless and uninhabit- 
able. It may simply have had its privacy interfered with by an un- 
authorized police search. If that family goes to a court of law and 
argues that it has a legal right to compensation, one can predict with 
virtual certainty that it will either have its home returned intact, 
receive compensation which will permit it to purchase a homelo or 
receive compensation for its losses due to the trespass. That is the 
import of the now famous aphorism in Semayne's Case," quoted 
by the Chief Justice, that "every man's house is his castle".12 
0 See: J. C. Hutcheson, "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
'Hunchy in Judicial Decisionyy (1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 274; Frank Knight, 
"The L i t a t i ons  of Scientific Methods in Economics" in R. G. Tugwell, ed., 
The Trend of Economics (1924) 254. 
7 J. KOZO~, supra, note I. 
8 They are distinguishable, of course, in terms of the situation which produced 
their homelessness, but they are equally impoverished, equally unable to care 
for their children, equally innocent of moral wrongdoing. 
9 There is a fourth homeless family ~vhich I discuss later. See infra, note 93. 
10 In fact, if there is any ambiguity in deciding if interest is payable on the 
award, Chief Justice Nemetz, in ensuring that "the owner is made economi- 
cally ~vholeYy, would award compound interest. See Minister of Highways and 
Public Works v. British Pacific Properties Ltd. [1g80] 2 W.W.R. 525 at 534 
(dissenting). 
11 ( I 604) 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 77 E.R. I 94. 
1" Eccles v. Bourque [1g73] 5 W.W.R. 434 at  449. 
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The second homeless family has also owned a home in the past, 
but has had its home either damaged or destroyed by another person 
or has had its privacy interfered with by an intruder. Again, if that 
homeless family goes to a judge and asks for compensation from the 
person who has caused its loss, it is almost certain that it will receive 
compensation which will permit it to restore the home to its pre- 
trespassed position and to compensate it for its losses.'' 
The third family does not have a home; it does not have shelter." 
The parent -the vast majority of the homeless consist of single 
parents- and her children live in conditions which we cannot 
comprehend : 
The rooms for the homeless families had roaches, water seeping 
through the ceilings, missing windowpanes, holes in the floor. . . . 
"Some mornings, there's no food. I give them a quarter if I have 
a quarter. They can buy a bag of chips. After school I give them 
soup. . . ."IS 
If that family goes to a judge, assisted by the most persuasive, learned 
and experienced lawyer imaginable:' it is certain that the parent will 
not obtain a court order awarding her a sum of money to purchase 
a home.17 While I might have said that the homeless family would 
almost certainly be refused funds or could remain in vacant houses, 
one need only refer to the well-known decisions which have evicted 
the homeless from abandoned apartments.'' 
18 The avaiIability of the trespass action and its importance in protecting the 
interests of homeowners is strengthened and emphasized by several subsidiary 
elements of the action. For example, unlike most legal actions, the defendant 
must prove that she acted unintentionally and without negligence in order to 
avoid legal liability. See: Cook v. Lewis [1g51] S.C.R. 830, [rg52] I D.L.R. 
I ; Larin v. Goshen (1975) 56 D.L.R. (3d) 719 (N.S.C.A.). 
14 The word "home" is likely derived from the Norse word heima, which refers 
not only to a place but also to "a comfortable state of being". See W. 
Rybczynski, Home: A Short History of an Idea (1986) at  62. 
15 J. KOZO~, "The Homeless and Their Children - Part 11", The New Yorker, 
I February 1988~36 at 52. 
l e  My thesis is strengthened by the unreality of that statement. Protecting 
what we have is an ideology which is reflected in the delivery of most legal 
services through the market so that those that have, and those who can afford 
legal representation, have their security protected. 
17 Some might argue that my last statement is too broad- that is, all I can 
and should say is that it is likely that she will not receive funds to purchase 
another home, or a t  least, if she finds shelter in an empty home, a judge 
would not evict her. The open-textured concepts of legal rules with their 
resulting indeterminacy would permit a judge to respond to the claim of the 
homeless. I agree with the indeterminacy argument. 
18 There are several tragic cases in which the courts, while decrying the injury 
which they must inflict when they apply the law "as it is", and while alleging 
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The response of law, the legal system and judges to the three home- 
less families tells us something profound about judicial values. The 
core judicial value which I ~vill attempt to describe in this paper 
is a norm which forms part of the entire structure of law: it forms 
part of all legal principles and rules; it comprises procedure and 
evidence; it is reflected in the rhetoric of judgment writing; and it 
defines how law is delivered to the community. In doing so I will be 
using examples drawn from the judicial record of Chief Justice Nern- 
etz to illustrate the way in which this core judicial value manifests 
itself in and constrains judicial decision-making." 
I t  is not, at least to me, a radical proposition to suggest that the 
primary value which drives and justifies judicial behaviour is an 
ovenvhelming, almost monistic concern with preserving and securing 
to individuals "what they This liberal democratic ideal is 
the commitment of law to liberty and freedom from the actions of 
others. And it applies with equal force to protect individuals from 
the actions of other individuals and actions of the community or state. 
The connection between law as "the individual dispute" with 
which we are familiar and law as a social institution preserving lib- 
erty is brought out in a recent report on the court system in Ontario. 
In 1973 the Ontario Latv Reform Commission, in its Report on 
that they trust '<charity" to provide for the homeless, have rearmed the 
right of property owners to take private measures to evict the homeless and 
to obtain judicial orders of eviction, notwithstanding the availability of the 
necessity defence. See: Southwark L.B.C. v. Williams [1g71] Ch. 734; McPhail 
v. Persons Unknown [1g73] 3 W.L.R. 71. These cases and the values they 
reflect are discussed in J. A. G. GrifEth, The Politics of the Judiciary, 2d ed. 
(1981) at 137-42. 
1' Before going on I should describe my research technique and its limitations. 
With the assistance of the computer research facilities at the Faculty of Law, 
I was able to obtain every reported decision with which Chief Justice Nemetz 
was involved either as the author of the written reasons, a concurring judge 
or as a dissenter. I have thus omitted by far the largest category of judgments 
-the Chief Justice's oral judgments. I have been told that they reflect a 
consistent concern with social justice and the norms and attitudes of the com- 
munity. As well, I have been necessarily selective in choosing judgments from 
among the many hundreds of written reasons which the Chief Justice has 
handed down. The latter limitation has not produced any substantial problems, 
for the Chief Justice has been consistent in his ideas throughout his tenure. 
20 Of course, judges also define what individuals have through their definition of 
property, liberty, security, privacy, contract, and through their definition of 
the permissible ways in which rights are transferred - trust, contract, gift, 
testamentary disposition and so on. The way in which this definitional exer- 
cise contributes to preserving what we have is somewhat more difficult to 
describe since in many cases the definition was created incrementally some time 
in the past. Where the judges define those concepts today, the distributional 
choices they represent are obvious. See Conclusion. 
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Administration of Ontario Courts?l began with the idea that the 
basic function of a court system in a civilized society is to impartially 
adjudicate disputes without resort to violence. While no one would 
disagree with that description, the larger political theory of which it 
is a part is apparent in a subsequent discussion of "the independence 
of the judiciary" in which Mr. Justice Rand's words are quoted with 
approval : 
[Ilndependence of judges. . . . enables the guarantee of security to the 
weak against the strong and to the individual against the community; 
it presents a shield against the tyranny of power . . . and against the 
irresponsibility and irrationality of popular action, whether of opinion 
or of violence. . . .22 [emphasis added]. 
Law is conceived of as a shield - it is a passive rather than activist 
social institution - it secures one's welfare against intrusion by the 
state, but does not actively engage in assisting those who live in 
poverty. Law represents the individual against the community, but 
does not assist in the efforts of the community to make the lives of 
individuals better. Law's values, if understood in this light, are as 
political as any other set of values. Here the political value of law 
is that it enables us to live our lives secure in the knowledge that we 
will not be subject to arbitrary intrusions on our liberty; we enjoy, 
through law, freedom from the state and from others. 
Understanding law in this way erases the alleged contradiction 
between order and liberty.23 Liberty and freedom from the state 
provides security and order to our lives. The law, while it necessarily 
invokes non-liberal concepts of restraint and coercion, does so only 
to prevent anarchy, and anarchy would, in the eyes of the law, leave 
liberty to be ravaged by "the strong or the unscrup~lous".~~ 
Presented with the hypothesis (at thii stage simply an assertion) 
that the law as an instrument of social order is designed to preserve 
what we have, three subsidiary questions must be addressed. First, 
how does it preserve what we have? Second, and more important, 
is preserving what we have a good thing? Third, and most important 
of all, can law be used as an instrument of social progress? In the next 
'1 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Administration of Ontario 
Courts, Part 1 (1973) (Chair: H. Allan Leal). 
22 Ibid. at 7, quoting Hon. I. C. Rand, Report of the Inquiry into the Alleged 
Misconduct of Mr. Justice Landreville (1966) at 95-6. 
23 H. Laski, "Law and the State" in H. Laski, Studies in Law and Politics 
(1932)- 
24 See B. N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) at 94. 
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two parts I will address the first and second questions, with particular 
emphasis on the contribution and role of Chief Justice Nemetz in 
the exercise of lawmaking. In the conclusion I will reflect on the 
conception of law as an instrument of social progress, which, at 
least in the view of some, is the legacy of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.25 
I. HOW LAW PRESERVES 
The question, "How does law preserve what we have?', can be 
addressed at hvo levels. Obviously, law preserves what we have by 
recognizing and thus legitimating security of expectations, property 
and thus autonomy. However, if law were to be openly recognized as 
engaged in that political it is unlikely that it could generate 
the moral legitimacy with which it is associated. Thus the deeper 
answer to the question, "How does law preserve what we have?', 
is extremely subtle and complicated. I would like to focus on several 
aspects of judging and justice which contribute to the legitimacy and 
moral authority of law in providing us with security from each other 
and the community.27 
First, and probably most important, law preserves what we have 
by incorporating a corrective rather than distributive model of jus- 
tice. The idea of corrective justice asks only that we determine 
whether one person has unlawfully or wrongfully caused an injury to 
another. If the answer to that question is positive, then we demand 
that the injurer restore the victim to the position she was in prior to 
the ~vrongful interference with her rights. The corrective justice 
model of lawmaking explicitly denies both the instrumental and 
social-ordering ideas which are commonly associated with political 
decision-making, and is intimately connected with choices about the 
legal liability of individuals to one another, and of the state to indi- 
viduals in many cases.gs It is quite easy to see that corrective justice 
" Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I I. 
2 W y  thesis is that judicial decision-making is a manifestation of law as  politics. 
The law as a political institution performs a function which other political 
institutions often do not; it preserves what we have. 
27 I must ignore several others. For example, the imposition of judicially created 
evidentiary immunities on coroners' inquests to provide witnesses with im- 
munities is an esample of the use of evidentiary rules to limit inquisitorial state 
powers. See Re WiLton Inquest (1968) 66 W.W.R. 522 (Nemetz J.A. dis- 
senting). 
28 Corrective justice, or rectificatory justice as it is sometimes called, is most 
often associated with Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle, The Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book V, Chapter 4 (David Ross trans. r 925). 
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permits and demands that we compensate the now homeless home- 
owners, and ignores the plight of the always homeless. 
While corrective justice as a model of lawmaking has considerable 
intuitive attractiveness, it is not without its failings. For example, it 
presumes that we know what individual rights ought to be recognized 
when compensation is claimed from the state or other individuals. 
That is, corrective justice does not tell us what rights we should 
protect from interference. It is clear, for example, that economic 
welfare is not, in the abstract, considered to be a right subject to 
protection under current applications of the corrective justice model 
of tort law.29 The role of law is not only to preserve what we have 
but also, by defining property, liberty, contract, privacy and so on, 
to create what we have. 
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of corrective justice is 
an overriding judicial reluctance to impose liability for "inaction". 
Briefly, while an individual may be legally responsible to another 
for acting in a fashion which injures the other, it is extremely difficult 
to persuade a judge that failing to assist another ought to give rise 
to legal liability. While this action/inaction has been considerably 
modified in Anns v. London Borough County of Merton?' there is 
little doubt that judges have retained a requirement that in order to 
impose liability the court will demand that the plaintiff demonstrate 
that the defendant either acted to induce reliance on her words or 
conduct, or created or increased a risk of damage to the injured 
The idea in corrective justice that merely failing to help another 
will not be a legal wrong is derived, at least in part, from a legitimate 
concern that to do so would demand the delivery of benefits to an- 
other and thus would constitute an unjustifiable interference with 
another's liberty to act as she chooses.32 It  finds voice not only in 
decisions limiting recovery of damages, but as well in the criminal 
29 See: R. A. Posner, "The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories 
of Tort Law" ( I 98 I ) I o J. Leg. Stud. 187; R. A. Epstein, "Nuisance Law: 
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints" (1979) 8 J. Leg. Stud. 49. 
30 119781 A.C. 728, [1g77] 2 AllE.R.492 (H.L.). 
81 See Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. I at 47 per 
Brennan J. 
32 Thus the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction has been justified by concerns 
with using tort law to "enforce general unselfishness". See: R. L. Hale, 
"Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-feasance" ( I  946) Colum. L. 
Rev. 196 at 215; F. Harper and F. James, Jr., The Law of Torts (1956) at 
1049. As Allen Linden put it, the doctrine manifests a concern for "rugged 
individualism, self-sufficiency, and the independence of human kind". A. Lin- 
den, Canadian Tort Law, 4th ed. ( I 988) at 265. 
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law, where judges, including Chief Justice Nemetz, are extremely 
hesitant to invoke the power of the state against individuals simply for 
agreeing to act in a general fashion which may constitute a criminal 
offence? or for merely failing to take positive steps to prevent a 
crime from being co~nmitted.~~ 
Second, law preserves what we have not only through its under- 
lying structure as a vehicle of corrective justice, but also through its 
rhetoric. In deciding cases, legal rhetoric justifies judicial choice 
through reference to rules rather than standards and norms in 
decision-makir~g.~"ome writers have presented a dichotomous ver- 
sion of state and The passive, reactive, libertarian state has its 
counterpart in a judicial order which pursues "fair" conflict resolu- 
tion as a goal of justice. The pursuers present themselves and law as 
neutral, objective and scientific technicians who, while they exercise 
choice, do so dispassionately and unideologically according to tech- 
nical standards. Conversely, the activist, progressive state would have 
its counterpart in a judicial order which pursues policy implementa- 
tion and development as a goal of justice. Judges in this latter state 
necessarily present themselves and law as non-neutral, and seek to 
achieve normative goals drawing on explicit general community 
This concern with rhetoric leads one to the most salient char- 
acteristic of judicial decision-making - the application of an al- 
legedly determinate legal rule based on precedent to a set of facts.'' 
33 Thus, for example, in R. v. Gill ( 1968) 67 W.W.R. 101, Nemetz J.A. set aside 
convictions for conspiracy to procure a miscarriage where the Crown prosecu- 
tor simply demonstrated a general agreement to refer women to an abortionist 
rather than a specific agreement relating to a particular criminal act. 
34 Thus in R. v. Bourne ( 1969) 7 I W.W.R. 385, Nemetz J.A., while refusing an 
appeal of an accused who had been convicted of possession of heroin, con- 
k e d  that more than "mere indifference or negative conduct" was required 
to demonstrate joint possession (at 387). Similarly, in R. v. Konken [197 I] 3 
W.W.R. 752, Nemetz J.A. set aside a conviction of a person who had, after 
taking an abandoned pump, discovered that it might belong to someone else 
who had lost a similar pump. Nemetz J.A. held that in order to convict for a 
"failure to act", unequivocal and unambiguous knowledge that the property 
belonged to someone else must be demonstrated. 
35 There are exceptions to this idea, including s. 24 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, supra, note 25, which permits a judge to exclude evi- 
dence where to admit i t  would bring the administration of justice into dis- 
repute. 
38 See M. R. DamaSka, The Faces of Justice and State Authority ( I  986). 
37 Ibid. at  88-9, 168-70. 
38 AS Jerome Frank puts it, legal rules generally consist of conditional statements 
referring to facts: 
For convenience, let us symbolize a legal rule by the letter R, the facts of a 
case by the letter F, and the court's decision of that case by the letter D. 
Heinonline - -  23 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 1 0 5  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  
I 06 U.B.C. LAW REVIEW, NEMETZ EDITION VOL. 23: I 
Even if one ignores that the set of facts is generated by an extra- 
ordinarily limiting set of procedural rules, and the set of legally 
relevant facts is itself narrowly defined, one must appreciate that 
judges make choices based on these facts in a certain fashion and 
that this institutional characteristic has important implications for 
the substantive outcome of cases. 
The most salient characteristic of judicial decision-making is the 
process of reasoning by analogy - the application of a particular 
rule enunciated or applied on a past occasion to a relevantly similar 
set of facts presented to the decision-maker. The result is, of course, 
a significant degree of legitimation of power associated with the 
apparent non-human source of authority, a significant risk of per- 
petuation of err0rs,3~ and non-articulation of the justification for the 
determination of relevant similarities or differences. The model is 
functionally static, involving a process of classifying new factual 
situations under existing rules?' At best, stare decisii represents a 
decision-making process which is incrementalist - the decision- 
maker making margin-dependent choices rather than evaluating all 
possible alternatives and making optimising decisions?' Decision- 
making based on precedent and analogy often incorporates unar- 
ticulated political, economic and social ideas, and is consistently con- 
strained by its necessarily historical perspective?' 
We can then crudely schematize the conventional theory of how courts 
operate by saying 
R X F = D  
In  other words, according to the conventional theory, a decision is a product 
ofanRandanI;. 
See J. Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (1950) 
at 14. 
39 For example, it is extraordinary that a rule which was developed to respond 
to an anachronistic land registry system in England in I 775 would be applied 
without significant modification in British Columbia for almost two centuries. 
I t  was not rejected until Chief Justice Laskin, adopting an unjudicial, func- 
tional rhetorical technique characteristic of the American Realists, finally laid 
it to rest. See A.V.G. Management Sciences Ltd. v. Barwell Develo#ments 
Ltd. [1g7g] 2 S.C.R. 43, [1g7g] I W.W.R. 330. 
40 See R. A. Samek, 'The Dynamic Model of the Judicial Process and the Ratio 
Decidendi of a Case" (1964) 42 Can. Bar Rev. 433. 
See: M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comfiarative and Political Analysis ( I 98 I ) ; 
P. Devlin, The Judge ( I 979). 
42 See B. N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (I 92 I ) reprinted in 
M. E.Hall, ed., Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo ( I 947) at I 07. 
Two relatively minor examples of this rhetorical technique can be drawn 
from the Chief Justice's judgments. Thus, for example, in deciding whether a 
play should be interpreted as a "publication" in the context of an obscenity 
prosecution, judges, including Chief Justice Nemetz, are likely to turn to for- 
mal dictionary meanings as justification for their decisions. See R. v. Small 
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Judges, in deciding cases, engage in the somewhat paradoxical 
exercise of "predicting history". The idea of precedent necessarily 
requires deference to superior institutions and to history. Judges, in 
deciding what we have, do so not by engaging in broad analysis of 
social choice, but by looking to and interpreting the decisions of other 
judges in the past. The rhetoric of law is to be bound to follow and 
implement decisions in like cases earlier in our history. Judges will 
vary considerably in the degree to which they will ignore, manipulate 
and adhere to precedent, but that does not deny its power to constrain 
judicial choice. 
Third, law preserves what we have through its requirement that 
judges be independent. Although independence has several com- 
ponents, for our purposes we can limit our analysis to two: first, a 
requirement that judges be independent from the current popular 
government; and second, that judges be impartial in respect of the 
participants and their dispute. The issue is of course of central impor- 
tance where, as in the case of many claims by citizens, the opponent 
is defined as the government. 
The role of independence is significant for several reasons. It per- 
mits the courts to impose sanctions on and attempt to regulate the 
behaviour of the legislative and executive branches of government, at 
least temporarilyP3 Courts can articulate and protect the interests of 
individuals and minorities without constant review by majoritarian 
institutions. And institutional independence achieves a degree of 
stability, continuity and thus security in the ongoing definition of 
entitlementsf4 
[1973] 4 W.W.R. 563 at  575. I must point out that the rhetoric is not linked to 
the outcome of the dispute, but is a legitimation technique which can be used 
to justify either outcome. In Small, Nemetz J.A. found that the trial judge 
had misdirected himself, and ordered a new trial. Similarly, the courts con- 
sistently interpret legislation as "preserving common law rules", thus impli- 
citly supporting the continuation and preservation of rights which are enun- 
ciated through those rules without serious analysis of the implications of that 
choice. That is not to say, of course, that the preservation of those common law 
rights is undesirable or that laudatory goals are not achieved through that 
vehicle. See Myers v. Myers [1979] 4 W.W.R. 353 (Chief Justice Nemetz 
holding that the Family Relations Act, S.B.C. 1972, c. 20 is remedial as it is 
intended to be in addition to and not in substitution of the common law. In 
that case the Chief Justice held that assets were to be divided equally between 
a husband and wife based on the equitable concept of a resulting trust.). 
43 Thus independence forms part of the ideology of the rule of law which holds 
that both the governed and the governing elites are formally equally amenable 
to the same judicial process. A recent example of this idea in practice is the 
decision of the Supreme Court to review esecutive decisions to employ nuclear 
arms in Canada. See Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen [1985] I S.C.R. 
441 at 472. 
44 As Jerome Frank wrote, "[tlradition . . . is the prime support of social sta- 
bility," supra, note 36 at  254. 
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The formal independence of judges from the political will of the 
current government is achieved through the embodiment of the Act 
of Settlement in s. gg of the Constitution Act, 1867: This formal 
independence is strengthened by associated provisions of the Con- 
stitution Act which provide for federal appointments and payment 
of salaries fixed by Parliament. In  theory, these provisions insulate 
judges from local pressure and reduce the ability of the executive to 
use financial coercion to influence judicial behaviour. 
However, much more important than formal independence is the 
independence associated with the stability of the judicial system. Ten- 
ure means that individual judges retain power for extended periods 
of time. The judicial appointment process means that new actors are 
introduced into the system incrementally. Judges, given their training 
in law, experience a significant socialization process during their legal 
and professional education which is enhanced by the hierarchical 
structure of the courts and seniority systems within the judiciary."' 
This experience coupled with the individuation of decision-making 
means that judges will be constrained to act consistently over time in 
accordance with their definition of relevant generalizations. And 
since the relevant generalizations will likely be very similar across 
judges, we can expect the curial institution to exhibit considerable 
stability in its behaviourP7 I t  is this stability which creates the security 
which protects what we have. 
Related to judicial independence from government is the require- 
ment of impartiality, which might best be described as "unrelated- 
ness, passivity and ignoranceay. First, we demand that the decision- 
maker in the curial process be unrelated to the parties, witnesses, 
the factual background of the dispute, and the outcome. As Chief 
Justice Nemetz wrote in a recent decision:' labour arbitrators as 
4"U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. The Act of Settlement, 1701, (U.K.) ,  12 & 13 
Wm. 111, c. 2, provides for the appointment of judges during good behaviour 
and their removal only by the Governor General on an address to both the 
Senate and House of Commons. 
46 Robert Samek calls this the "sub-model of obediencey', supra, note 40 at  435 
passim. 
47 The process of reasoning which one finds in the case law as well as in consti- 
tutional argument is quite simple - like cases should be treated alike. What 
makes one case 'like" another, however, cannot be determined by indepen- 
dent criteria; i t  depends upon values which may not be articulated. The 
stability in law is created by the consistency of judicial values as much as by 
.anything else. 
48 Refrigeration Workers Union, Local 516 v. Labour Relations Board of British 
Columbia [1g86] 4 W.W.R. 223 at  228, quoting Rand J. in Szilard v. Szasz 
[1g55] S.C.R. 3 a t  4. In this case, the Chief Justice refused to permit the 
Labour Relations Board from appointing a union member to a panel not- 
Heinonline - -  23 U. Brit. Colurn. L. Rev. 108 1988-1989 
1988 JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 109 
administrative decision-makers engaged in judicial activities must act 
with "free, independent and impartial mindsyy. Second, we demand 
"ignoranceyy in the sense that we demand that the judge receive her 
first knowledge of the factual dispute through the formal presentation 
of information by the parties. And third, we require that the judge 
remain relatively passive throughout the proceedings - the arche- 
typal neutral umpirePg It is facile to think that impartiality means 
that judges have no views as to right and wrong, no intuitions as to 
moral judgment, no connection to the current government and no 
policy inclinations." Fact-finding, the interpretation of statutes and 
cases, the exercise of choice in applying concepts of reasonableness 
and a myriad of similar facts all involve political, economic, social 
and moral reasoning. Nonetheless, we have conventionally presented 
the judge as being a "political, economic, and social eunuch" who 
has no interest in the world outside hi judgments.51 
There is little doubt that Chief Justice Nemetz considers judicial 
independence as constituting the core of his institutional character; 
in his writing he has described it as "a fundamental pillar of our 
democratic and has applied rigorous standards to adminis- 
trative decision-makers who have been challenged for bias. He ap- 
preciates that the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends more on 
the perceived and actual independence of the judiciary than on the 
substantive outcome of their choices. Nonetheless, recognizing that 
judges are independent in the senses I have described does not mean 
that the law and the judiciary as institutions are impartial in deter- 
mining the claims of the truly homeless and the homeless who have 
lost their homes. I t  does not mean impartiality as between the treat- 
ment of claims which have been recoopized in the past and the 
treatment of not yet recognized claims in the future. 
withstanding that the individual was a person of both integrity and high 
qualification in his field. 
49 See Denning L.J. in Jones v. National Coal Board [1g57] 2 K.B. 55 at  64. 
At the same time, lawyers will generally hold the view that overtly "political" 
appointments are undesirable. By political I mean the appointment of judges 
who are connected through past experience or relationships with the current 
government. The major concern voiced in this context is that "quiet patron- 
age appointments to the judiciary of people such as former Manitoba premier 
Sterling Lyon have demeaned the judicial process and brought it into dis- 
repute," see K. Martin, "Scrutinize All Judicial Appointments, Lawyers' 
Group Urges", The Globe and Mail (30 January 1987). 
61 J. A. G. Griffith, supra, note 18 at 204. 
GWemetz C.J.B.C., "The Concept of an Independent Judiciary" (1986) 20 
U.B.C. L. Rev. 285 at 291. 
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Fourth, the core value of law in preserving what we have is re- 
flected and emphasized by the institutional characteristics of the 
courts, and in particular by the limited self-defined remedial powers 
which judges exercise.53 Dichotomous determinations of right and 
wrong coupled with a binding award of monetary compensation and 
perhaps injunctive relief to restore or preserve the status quo, I think 
accurately describes traditional judicial remedial authority. Again, 
one can easily find in Chief Justice Nemetz's judicial record refer- 
ences to the limited remedial authority which courts should exerci~e?~ 
In  general judges have adopted an extremely conservative set of 
remedial tools: awards of damages, limited negative injunctions and 
declarations being the most common. 
In  all cases judicial remedies represent the remedial component 
of a model of law which will necessarily preserve and restore indi- 
viduals to their pre-injured state. The shortcomings of this model 
which significantly limit the ability of the institution to effect funda- 
mental structural reform are amplified when applied to the case of 
governmental wrongs.55 This description of judicial remedial instru- 
ments might be contrasted with the remedial instruments of ombuds- 
man offices, a non-legal institution which, while independent from 
the current government, is not impartial. Ombudsman ofices are 
55 In  fact, the entire institutional design of the court system reinforces protecting 
what one has. For example, the obvious fact that the Canadian legal system 
can be invoked, as a practical matter, only by the more wealthy, and when 
invoked can be utilized extensively by that group, reinforces the idea of law 
as preserving what one has. As recently as 1970, Nemetz J.A. could not dis- 
regard the amount of a lawsuit in exercising his discretion to give leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada even though no issue of public inter- 
est or important question of law was present. See Royal Trust Company v. 
Ford and Christ Church Cathedral Buildings Ltd. (1970) 73 W.W.R. I at 7. 
Yet at  the same time, the Chief Justice was extremely sensitive to the failings 
of the legal system to ensure adequate criminal representation. In  R.  v. John- 
son [1g73] 3 W.W.R. 513, Nemetz J.A. allowed an appeal from a trial in 
which Johnson was convicted without an adequate professional defence. 
Another example is the extremely archaic class action processes in Canada, 
which represent an almost insurmountable obstacle to access to the legal sys- 
tem by large groups of individuals who have suffered relatively minor losses 
or are seeking legislative review. Here again, Chief Justice Nemetz is some- 
what paradoxical. His decision in Shaw v. The Real Estate Board of Greater 
Vancouver [1g73] 4 W.W.R. 391 is one of the very few progressive class 
action decisions in Canada. As Nemetz J.A. put it, the purposes of class actions 
are "to provide an inexpensive means of preventing the frustration of justice 
by costly . . . litigation" (at 402). 
~4 See Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Western 
Wholesale Drug Ltd. (1969) 68 W.W.R. ngg at  302 (injunction issued 
against defendant employer to restrain unfair labour practices must "delineate, 
wherever practicable, the precise acts or classes of acts which are intended to 
be enjoined"). 
55 See H. J. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 4th ed. (1981) at  355-7. 
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characterized by investigatory, bureaucratic, non-binding interest 
mediation models of dispute resolution. The outcome is often to 
explain and disclose the basis for bureaucratic action, to improve 
bureaucratic processes, and to recommend and perhaps to procure 
appropriate remedies including information, the delivery of social 
benefits through the reversal of bureaucratic decisions, and compen- 
sation. Similarly, one might develop structural injunctions which 
can be used by the judiciary through the appointment of administra- 
tive officers to compel the delivery of prison services and educational 
programs to ensure that constitutional violations are not ~ommitted.'~ 
Incorporating a model of corrective justice, employing historically 
focused precedent based decision-making, insisting on judicial inde- 
pendence and impartiality and applying extremely limited remedial 
sanctions all combine to define law as an institution which will neces- 
sarily result in the preservation of what we have. Indeed it is difficult, 
if one takes judicial decision-making seriously, to imagine that it 
could do anything else. 
11. THE GOODNESS OF SECURITY 
Given my description of how law preserves what we have, we can 
address the second question, which, not surprisingly, is much more 
difficult to answer - "Is preserving what people have a good thing?" 
Perhaps the dimensions of the problem can be understood if the ques- 
tion were rephrased - "Is preserving property and liberty a good 
thing?" There is, sadly, no answer to that question; or rather there 
are two answers which are contradictory. 
First, knowing whether securing what we have is good depends on 
our definitions of liberty, property and so on. Chief Justice Nernetz, 
throughout the course of hi judicial career, has articulated and ex- 
pressed his ideas on several fundamental characteristics of civil lib- 
erty which the law preserves - the privacy of one's home, religious 
freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of contract and freedom from 
physical incarceration. 
The property one has in one's home is, as we all know, a central 
theme in the common law process. Nemetz J.A. in Eccles v. Bourque6' 
applied an extremely restrictive interpretation of the Criminal Code5' 
56 As Owen Fiss has put it in The Civil Rights Injunction ( 1g78), the structural 
injunction represents an injunction "seeking to effectuate the reform of a 
social institution" at g. 
67 Supra, note 12. 
5.3 R.S.C. 1970, C. C-34, S. 450. 
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in refusing to permit the police to rely on a defence unavailable to 
private citizens when they (the police) unlawfully entered Eccles' 
apartment in pursuit of a fugitive. The police were not in uniform, 
but were visibly armed; they did not request pennission to enter the 
apartment, but pushed the door open. Eccles sued for damages and 
was successful at trial. Nemetz J.A., dissenting on appeal, would have 
affirmed the trial decision, arguing that ccscrupulous adherence must 
be had for the principles set out at common law" which replate the 
conduct of the police in entering a house without a warrant.6D Prop- 
erty, not as an end in itself but as an aspect of liberty and privacy 
and family, is thus defended from interference by the state. 
Similarly, the protection afforded to political debate and com- 
mentary - the liberty to speak one's conscience - has been rigor- 
ously defended in the political idea of liberalism and by the Chief 
Justice. In Vander Zalm v. Times Pub2ishersG0 Chief Justice Nemetz 
delivered the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal which over- 
turned the trial decision and dismissed Vander Zalm's action for 
defamation arising out of the publication of a cartoon which de- 
picted him, representing the Miniitry of Human Resources, plucking 
wings from a fly. The idea of freedom of speech - that "the public 
interest requires that. . . public conduct. . . be open to the most 
searching critici~m"~' - is an aspect of liberty in democratic societies 
which has been constantly defended by the Chief Justice, not only 
in the Vander Zalm decision but elsewhere as well?' 
The Chief Justice's concern with freedom of political debate evi- 
denced in the Vander Zalm decision is linked to a broader concept of 
intellectual and personal autonomy that is reflected in his decisions 
which respect religious conviction. In R. v. DavieG3 an accused who 
59 Sufira, note 12 a t  450. 
80 [1g80] 4 W.W.R. 259. 
61 Ibid. at  261, quoting Bain J. in Martin v. Manitoba Free Press Co. (1892) 8 
Man. R. 50 at 72. 
62 See Pacific Press Ltd. v. The Queen in Right of British Columbia 119771 5 
W.W.R. 507 (B.C.S.C.). In this case, Nemetz C.J.S.C. used the Canadian Bill 
of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. 111, to quash warrants which were used to seize 
material from The Vancouver Sun. He held that a justice of the peace, in 
deciding to issue a warrant against a newspaper which may have the effect of 
impeding its publication, must have regard to the special place of a free press 
under the Bill of Rights, ss. I (f) and 2. He held that the Justice did not con- 
sider whether alternative sources of information were available and whether 
reasonable steps had been taken to obtain the information from those 
sources. 
83 [1g81] 2 W.W.R. 513. 
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had been charged with arson was left alone in a room which was 
equipped with a hidden microphone and video camera. After the 
police left the room, the accused dropped to his knees, saying 
"0 God, let me get away with it just this once." The trial judge 
refused to admit the statement, holding that it was an unauthorized 
interception of a private communication, and thus was inadmissible 
under s. 178 of the Criminal Code. The Chief Justice, dissenting, 
would have confirmed the trial judgment. The Chief Justice held 
that the statement was a private communication within s. I 78. I 6 ( I ) 
of the Criminal Code. As he put it: "To hold othenvise not only 
would violate . . . the purpose of the Act but would also . . . be repug- 
nant to all who hold religious beliefs, and thus contrary to the public 
intere~t."~ 
The Chief Justice has also employed law to protect one's liberty to 
contract from government interference. Liberty to contract encom- 
passes not only activities designed to maximize profit, but also extends 
to the liberty to engage in activities to improve one's well-being, as 
well as to activities through which one defines one's most personal 
relationships with others. Chief Justice Nemetz has recognized the 
significance of contract as a liberal concept both in common law 
contract decisionsGkd in constitutional litigation. In Bhindi and 
London v. British Columbia Projectionists' Local 34866 the Chief 
Justice was faced with an argument that a collective agreement which 
included a "closed shop" provision should be held unenforceable as 
contravening the Charter of Rights and Freed0ms.6~ The Chief 
Justice interpreted s. 26 of the Charter as including the "ability 
04 Ibid. at  5 19. 
05 Common law contract decisions support liberal notions of contract through the 
adoption of concepts which preserve enforceability in the face of regulatory 
schemes which require licensing of certain contracting agents, and which 
arguably would be strengthened if the courts were to declare illegal those con- 
tracts entered into by unlicensed individuals. Chief Justice Nemetz's decisions 
in this contest are consistent with judicial attitudes promoting contract 
enforcement. See Davidson and Co. v. McLeery (1970) 75 W.W.R. 278 
(contract for sale of shares enforceable notwithstanding that the Securities 
Act, 1962, S.B.C. 1962, c. 55, required licensing of salesmen). 
Similarly, the courts have been reluctant to set aside contracts where argu- 
ments are made that the contract is a product of economic coercion associated 
with monopoly power or consumer ignorance. See Arrow Transfer Co. v. 
Royal Bank of Canada [1g71] 3 W.W.R. 241 at  265 where Nemetz J.A. en- 
forced a verification agreement entered into nobvithstandiig allegations that 
the banks had colluded to produce a standard contract imposed on con- 
sumers generally in the industry. 
" [1g86] 5 W.W.R. 303. 
=7 Su#ra, note 25. 
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to enter into private contractsn,6* and encouraged by American 
authority, refused to subject contract and other "purely private 
action" to the principles and constraints embodied in the Charter. 
As the Chief Justice put it: "To include such private commercial 
contracts under the scrutiny of the Charter could create havoc in the 
co~llxnercial ife of the country."69 
Finally, law protects one's physical liberty. The core of the liberal 
idea of law is to prevent, except under extraordinarily stringent pro- 
cedures, incarceration of private citizens by the state. One can point 
to a number of instances in the Chief Justice's record where his con- 
cern with personal freedom is readily apparent; as the Chief Justice 
has said, "any ambiguity . . . must be resolved in favour of the 
liberty of the s~bject."'~ This concern with the protection of physical 
liberty reached its ultimate expression in the participation of the 
Chief Justice in Reference Re Section g4(2) of the Motor Vehicle 
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 2887 in which the Court of Appeal held 
unconstitutional those provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act which 
provided for a mandatory jail term for persons convicted of driving 
while their licences were suspended without regard to either their 
negligence or intent to commit a crime. The Court, on one view, 
radically altered the balance between the judiciary and legislative 
institutions, by reviewing not only the procedural safeguards required 
by ideals of justice, but the content of the legislation itself. The deci- 
sion was motivated by judicial abhorrence of the idea that a person 
could be imprisoned without the opportunity to demonstrate an 
68 Supra, note 66 at 3 I I. 
69 Ibid. 
70 R.  V. Turcotte and Parkinson (1969) 69 W.W.R. 705 at 720. In this case 
Nemetz J.A. dissented from a decision which would have permitted the Court 
to use the provisions of the Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1952, C. 
217, to impose indeterminate sentences on young offenders, thus increasing 
the sentences imposed under the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 38. 
Nemetz J.A. held that in order to permit more severe sentences, one would 
have to be able to point to an express legislative provision to that end. 
As well, a concern with the protection of physical liberty from interference 
by the state is manifested in the establishment of stringent procedural rights 
including the right to a public trial: R. v. N. [1g80] I W.W.R. 68 (Juvenile 
Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3, while it mandates trials "without 
publicity" should not be interpreted as permitting trials to be held "in 
camera"). I t  is reaffirmed in decisions which affirm the great importance of 
burdens of proof and the requirement that the Crown prove beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt all elements of the offence charged. See R. v. Biedler [I  9751 3 
W.W.R. 381 (B.C.S.C.) (Crown must prove that proceedings were com- 
menced within limitation period established under the Securities Act, 1967, 
S.B.C. I 967, c. 45). 
7 1  119831 3 W.W.R. 756. 
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honest and reasonable mistake, or to prove that he acted without a 
guilty intent?' 
If one takes the judicial record of the Chief Justice one finds one's 
personal right to one's home, freedom of speech and political debate, 
freedom of contract and physical liberty as describing the content of 
liberty. That content leaves no doubt in most of our minds that "pre- 
serving what we haveyy is good. But there is mother issue. 
More important than understanding the content of liberty and 
security of the person, a decision as to whether security and liberty 
is good depends on the identity of the person being asked the question. 
If one has those things which are preserved - liberty, ideas, ethical 
values, a family, property, a home - the answer is yes. And it is true 
to say that everyone has something. Not only is it a good thing, but 
it is inconceivable how we could exist as individuals or part of a 
community without it. Similarly, if one is relatively well-endowed 
either with wealth or abilities and has enjoyed an environment which 
has nurtured the development of her personal faculties, then again 
the answer is yes. For by promising security, one can apply oneself 
with the kno.rvledge that the future products of one's labour will be 
preserved. Security and the promise of security are things we all 
want. It permits us to plan our personal lives, it provides incentives 
for and facilitates economic investment, and it reduces the risks of 
whatever propensity we might have to engage in private violent 
redress. 
While I can say that providing security is a good thing, I can also 
say that it is not enough. The idea of security and liberty ignores one's 
connection with the larger society in which we live. The model of 
man which is incorporated in the liberal idea of law, if left at that, 
is one in which individuals apparently care little except for them- 
selves. All of the ideas comprising the preservation of liberty are of 
little if any value to the homeless. Not only do they have nothing, 
they r d I  have nothing unless we do something for them, and we have 
seen that law, while it preserves what one has, will not actively assist 
those who may need what we have. To say that liberty must be con- 
strained by community interests is not to say that liberty is bad, but 
rather that "monism" of any sort is dangerous. Because equality, 
justice, political participation and so on are important political values 
in Canada does not entail that liberty is unimportant. 
72 The Court, ibid. at 764, accepted the statement of Dickson C.J.C. that "there 
is a generally held revulsion against punishment of the morally innocent." 
R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie 119781 2 S.C.R. 1299 at 1310, (1978) 85 D.L.R. 
(3d) 16 I at I 70. 
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The obvious response to this commentary on law is a relatively 
simple question-"How can I expect judges to do this?" They do not 
have the authority to do so; they do not have the knowledge or ex- 
pertise to do so; they do not have the administrative staffs to deliver 
social services to the homeless; they do not have the resources to allo- 
cate to the homeless. And so on. Some of those arguments have merit. 
My answer is that I don't expect judges to do this. Rather, my pur- 
pose in presenting the values of judges in this fashion is to point out 
that law, whether it would preserve what we have or redistribute 
wealth, is as much as any other form of justice a political institution. 
We should admit that law doesn't assist the homeless, but that does 
not mean that we should not make the choice as a society to do so. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Which brings me to the final question. If I am right about this 
core judicial value, how can anyone expect law to be an instrument 
of social change? Certainly law is interstitially progressive. As I ex- 
plained earlier, by protecting future entitlements, law facilitates 
human action.73 Second, and again thii is reflected in Chief Justice 
Nemetz's judgments, law is not stagnant. At best, stare decisis repre- 
sents a decision-making process which is incrementalist, the decision 
maker making margin-dependent choices rather than evaluating all 
possible alternatives and making optimizing decisions.74 But there is 
nothing in law which permits one to say that it is designed to do this, 
and there is nothiig in law which suggests that interstitial progress 
will be able to respond positively to the claims of the third homeless 
family. 
Some might argue that the CharterT5 has transformed law, and that 
while the law of the past is not progressive, the law of the future will 
be. One might argue that one progressive idea in the Charter is that 
of equality - and in particular a right of equal benefit of the law 
under s. 15. But here we are concerned not with equality as between 
individuals, but with equality between groups - an idea which Chief 
Justice Nemetz invoked in the now famous decision of R. v. Burn- 
shine.?" In that case the Chief Justice used the Canadian Bill of 
Rightf7 to strike down the "indeterminate sentence" provisions of 
7S S. Coval and J. C. Smith, Law and Its Presuppositions (1986). 
74 Supra, note 4 I. 
75 Supra, note 25. 
[1g74] 3 W.W.R. 228. 
R.S.C. 1970, App. 111, s. I (b). 
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the federal Prisons and Reformatories Act7' which applied only to 
British Columbians. 
The relevance of equality to the homeless lies in the transformation 
of economic inequality, traditionally a private issue, into a public, 
legal and constitutional question. Arguments have been made in the 
United States that the distribution of public services (from the most 
mundane street repair work to public educational expenditures) 
across communities so as to leave some groups less well off than others 
constitutes unequal treat~nent.'~ Sadly, the paradigm of law neces- 
sarily constrains the power of the idea of equal treatment to respond 
to the homeless and economically disadvantaged. 
A powerful example of the limits of law, as I have attempted to 
describe it, is the recent judicial and political clash in British Colurn- 
bia over social welfare funding. We can begin with the decision of 
the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Silano v. The Queen in 
Right of British Col~mbia.8~ In that case John Silano challenged 
regulations enacted under the Guaranteed Available Income for 
Need Act? which provided $25.00 less per week to single social 
welfare recipients under twenty-six years of age. The Court struck 
down the regulations as contravening s. 15 of the Charter. As Spencer 
J. held, $25.00 is "of real importance to many of those 
There are two problems facing those who would point to this as 
an example of the progressive character of the Charter. That is, to 
applaud this decision ignores both a critical assumption underlying 
the decision as well as the final outcome in the dialogue between 
welfare recipients, the courts and government. The critical assump- 
tion, of course, is the existence of the G.A.I.N. Act. The equality 
provisions of the Charter cannot justify judicial provision of welfare 
benefits or programs for the homeless; the judicial act is only supple- 
mentary to political choice. The critical outcome is the response of 
the government in the Silano case - to reduce the level of payments 
to all G.A.I.N. recipients rather than raise the level of the less well 
off. Here the judicial act is only preliminary to political ch0ice.8~ 
78 R.S.C. 1970,~.P-21,~. 150. 
TD See C. M. Haar and D. W. Fessler, The Wrong Side of the Tracks (1986). 
119871 5 W.W.R. 739. 
61 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 158, Reg. 479/76, Schedule A, s. 4 [re-en. Reg. 65/84, s. 3; 
am. Reg. 155/87, s. 21. 
82 Supra, note 80 at 741. 
83 See B. Parfitt and M. Cernetig, "Welfare War Vowed Over Cuts", The 
Vancouu~rSun (14Augus.t 1987) A-1-2. 
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If equality rights can do little for the homeless, can liberal rights 
of "liberty and security of the person" do more? That isy law can 
also be progressive through a redefinition of liberty or property to 
encompass more than those aspects of welfare protected at common 
law. In  defining liberty to include the power of control over one's 
reproductive system the Supreme Court of Canada has improved the 
welfare of women in ways which I cannot begin to c~mprehend .~~  
Liberty can include more than freedom from others and the com- 
munity. As Madam Justice Wilson said in Jones v. The  
it can include the right to raise and educate one's children without 
conforming to state-mandated educational programs: 
[qhe  framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing "liberty" as a fun- 
damental value in a free and democratic society had in mind the free- 
dom of the individual to develop and realize his potential to the full, 
to plan his own life to suit his own character, to make his own choices 
for good or ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and even eccen- 
tric. . . .86 
Chief Justice Nemetz's remarks in Robson v. The Queens7 predated 
those of the Supreme Court of Canada in Jones. In Robson the 
accused was convicted for driving while prohibited from doing so, 
after his licence was suspended by a police officer at a roadside alcohol 
check. The Chief Justice began by disavowing any attempt to incor- 
porate property rights into the Charter's liberty concepts. He con- 
tinued by defining liberty as encompassing more than the idea of 
"mere freedom from bodily and extended it to include 
"the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue and 
. . . cannot be restrained except for propergovernmental  objective^."^^ 
[Nemetz C. J.B.C.'s emphasis] While those words might be inter- 
84 The same ideas about liberty, however, can explain decisions at common law 
which made it extremely difficult to convict abortionists. See supra, note 33. 
Similarly, in Carruthers and Whelton v. Langley [1g86] 2 W.W.R. 459, the 
Chief Justice participated in a per curiam decision of the Court of Appeal 
which refused private citizens permission to bring an action which was in- 
tended to force Lions Gate Hospital to abide by s. 25 I of the Criminal Code, 
supra, note 58, in a particular fashion. 
85 [1g86] 2 S.C.R. 284, (1986) 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569. 
86 Ibid. at 3 18 S.C.R., at 582 D.L.R. (dissenting). 
87 ( 1985) 19 D.L.R. (4th) I 12. In a later decision, Hundal v. Superintendent of 
Motor Vehicles [1g85] 5 W.W.R. 49, the Chief Justice held that s. 86 of the 
Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, C .  288, did not deprive the accused of his 
liberty to drive without due process of law, given the procedural structures 
established in the Act. 
88 Ibid. at I 14. 
89 Ibid. He adopted the words of Chief Justice Warren in Bolling v. Sharpe 
( 1954) 347 u-s. 497. 
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preted as encompassing positive rights to public benefits, it is clear 
that the idea of liberty is still that of liberty from state interference, 
rather than liberty to obtain things one does not already have from 
the state?O This point is made forcefully by Madam Justice Wilson 
in Jones, where she argues that : 
Of course, this freedom is not untrammelled. We do not live in splen- 
did isolation. We live in communities with other people. Collectivity 
necessarily circumscribes individuality and the more complex and 
sophisticated the collective structures become, the greater the threat 
to individual liberty in the sense protected by s. 7 [of the Charte~-I.g1 
Thus neither liberty or equality ~vill ikely permit law to be pro- 
gressive in the sense of providing a vehicle to assist the third homeless 
family in my original example. To fully appreciate why this is so, 
one might imagine the implications of a progressive legal system. 
When law "develops" even incrementally and thus does more than 
preserve, it must redistribute; to expand or modify an interest or an 
aspect of individual welfare is usually nec=arily to subtract from or 
modify an aspect of collective or personal welfare currently enjoyed 
by a different group or individual. Thus regardless of one's views of 
the decision of the Supreme Court in Morgentaler v. The Queen,g2 
by expanding liberty to include reproductive choice, we have un- 
doubtedly redistributed power away from men.03 Regardless of one's 
views of the relative deservedness of the three homeless families, if 
judges were to provide housing to the third homeless family, they 
would have to demand the resources necessary to do so from the 
population at large. One obvious way in ~vhich the problem of 
redistribution is hidden is through a legal system which is defined by 
preserving only what one has. 
Conceiving of law as progressive, as demanding the redistribution 
of wealth rather than merely correcting injustices, leads some to 
argue that to do so crosses illegitimately the boundary into the legis- 
lative arena, which is the forum in which redistribution takes place. 
DO At the same time, the liberty to drive has its source in a government-issued 
licence, and thus this case may be used to establish more general property 
rights in government benefits. 
Ul Supra, note 85 at 3 19 S.C.R., a t  582 D.L.R. 
92 [1g88] I S.C.R. 30, (1988) 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
03 An obvious rationale for a non-redistributive judiciary is that the interests of 
those who are less well off as a result of the redistribution are, given the cur- 
rent design of judicial process, not represented in the process. The response 
to this, of course, is to argue for a new institutional design, not to argue 
against redistribution. 
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There is, however, considerable debate as to whether redistribution 
takes place as it ought to in the legislative arena - the political power 
of the homeless is somewhat of a contradiction in terms.= More im- 
portant, to say that it ought to be legislatures which redistribute 
points out that ''law as justice" embodied in the Charter is not the 
answer to some of the more tragic social ills which we experience. 
Law does some things very well and other things not well at all. 
People who hope that the Charter will assist them in obtaining what 
they do not have wiu have two thousand years of corrective justice 
to overcome. 
So in the end we will never know how the Chief Justice as a judge 
could have possibly responded to the third homeless family. The 
legal system does not recognize it and there is little in law which 
permits a compassionate person to respond to its requests for help. 
94 This point can be appreciated by considering a fourth homeless family. This 
family owned a home in the past, but is homeless as a result of a natural dis- 
aster. Here one finds very well-developed and sophisticated government pro- 
grams to assist this group of homeless in dealing with the trauma of disloca- 
tion and in rebuilding their lives and homes. See supra, note g. 
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